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SUMMARY
Cloud of Things (CoT) is a novel concept driven by the synergy of the Internet of Things (IoT) and cloud
computing paradigm. The CoT concept has expedited the development of smart services resulting in the pro-
liferation of their real world deployments. However, new research challenges arise because of the transition
of research-driven and proof-of-concept solutions to commercial offerings, which need to provide secure,
energy-efficient, and reliable services. An open research issue in the CoT is to provide a satisfactory level
of security between various IoT devices and the cloud. Existing solutions for secure CoT communication
typically use devices with pre-loaded and pre-configured parameters, which define a static setup for secure
communication. In contrast to existing pre-configured solutions, we present an adaptable model for secure
communication in CoT environments. The model defines six secure communication operations to enable
CoT entities to autonomously and dynamically agree on the security protocol and cryptographic keys used
for communication. Further on, we focus on device agreement and present an original solution, which uses
the Agile Cryptographic Agreement Protocol in the context of CoT. We verify our solution by a prototype
implementation of CoT device agreement based on required security level, which takes into account the
capabilities of communicating devices. Our experimental evaluation compares the average processing times
of the proposed secure communication operations demonstrating the viability of the proposed solution in
real-world deployments. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
We are witnessing the rise of a novel concept, the Cloud of Things (CoT), which arises from the con-
vergence of the Internet of Things (IoT) with the cloud computing paradigm. Networked devices,
sensors, actuators, and wearables connect nowadays to the Internet, either directly or through inter-
mediaries such as smartphones or gateways, to create smart spaces and heterogeneous environments
of interlinked devices. IoT devices represent rich data sources about their surrounding environment
with a potential to produce vast amounts of data that need to be processed and analyzed, often in real-
time, emphasizing the need for novel solutions in the domain of big data processing [1]. Because
cloud computing offers a utility-driven service model, which enables dynamic use of computing
resources and adapts well to the requirements of a particular service [2], it represents an optimal
environment for hosting back-end IoT platform components. Furthermore, the IoT and cloud benefit
from the synergy of the two environments to facilitate utility-driven sensing and actuation services
(Sensing-as-a-Service) [3] where devices are mapped to their virtual representations while many
applications can share the available virtualized resources.
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Transparent and secure access and usage of available IoT resources, as well as secure communi-
cation of IoT devices with cloud infrastructure is crucial to preserve citizen security and privacy in
the CoT context. However, the integration of IoT spaces with the cloud has created a new set of chal-
lenges with regards to the control of data flow within CoT environments. IoT resource virtualization
and the opening of data to third parties create new questions regarding data source ownership, verifi-
able data origin and data trustworthiness. Another serious problem is eavesdropping and monitoring
without the knowledge of the observed person. Thus, security is a challenging problem for the CoT,
a prerequisite that needs to be dealt with high caution before CoT platforms can reach a level of full
economical exploitation.
Devices in the CoT can interconnect in an ad hoc fashion while also communicating with a
back-end cloud. The communication needs to be secure, which requires an agreement protocol to
enable communicating parties to agree on a cryptographic algorithm and keys used to protect the
exchanged messages. Flexible and adaptable agreement mechanisms are needed in CoT environ-
ments because IoT devices have limited computing and bandwidth resources and thus cannot store
all possible keys and support dynamical choice of the best cryptographic algorithm. Because CoT
services are driven by the underlying data sources, it is critical to validate a sensor as a credible
data source. For example, an electrical company needs to measure household energy consumption
in a credible way and thus needs to validate data readings received from household smart meters.
For some data readings, it is not even sufficient to validate their origin, but rather their content
needs to be secured because messages contain private information, which should not be revealed to
third parties. A good example are medical readings, which should be accessible only to physicians
or patients.
In this paper, we present two major contributions: a model for secure communication within
a CoT environment and prototype implementation of the agreement operation of the model. This
model defines a minimal set of objects and operations that are needed to establish secure com-
munication between various IoT devices and the cloud. It is based on six secure communication
operations, namely agreement, sign, verify signature, hash-based message authentication code
(HMAC), encrypt, and decrypt. The model describes devices by the following security properties:
a set of available communication interfaces, hardware capabilities, public and private key pairs,
and supported cryptographic algorithms. Note that trust establishment between devices and privacy
related issues are out of scope of this paper. We rather focus on establishing a secure communication
within the CoT. The model is in accordance with a comprehensive list of security risks given by the
Open Web Application Security Project foundation for the year 2014 [4]. We address the following
security risks in the paper: insufficient authentication, lack of transport encryption, and insufficient
security configurability.
The agreement operation uses the Agile Cryptographic Agreement Protocol (ACAP) [5] to
implement an adaptable security management agreement operation as defined in the secure CoT
communication model.
ACAP is designed to be secure, adaptable, lightweight, and opportunistic. It provides the means
for devices to securely exchange data while dynamically adapting to the required security level by
using a cryptographic algorithm agreement procedure. This procedure ranks cryptographic algo-
rithms based on valuation functions, which take into account both algorithm and device/environment
properties. The solution is opportunistic in a sense that it does not require additional configuration
before the start of communication. ACAP has been modeled and formally verified by using the
Scyther verification tool [6, 7] to demonstrate the soundness of the implemented operation, con-
sequently preventing security attacks on the proposed solution. To showcase that ACAP is usable
in practice, we have verified its prototype implementation on a number of different devices. The
performed experimental evaluation compares the average processing times of the proposed secure
communication operations and demonstrates the viability of the proposed solution in real-world
deployments.
The paper is structured in the following way: Section 2 provides description of the CoT environ-
ment with an emphasis on security issues. Section 3 presents the secure communication model for
the CoT. The implementation details of the agreement operation as well as experimental evaluation
of the six proposed secure communication operations is provided in Section 4. Section 5 provides a
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brief overview of related work addressing the field of CoT/IoT security, while Section 6 concludes
the paper and gives directions for future work.
2. SECURE COMMUNICATION SCENARIOS IN THE CLOUD OF THINGS
The CoT ecosystem can be described as tiered architecture composed of various devices inter-
connected through different networked environments. The architecture is depicted by a number of
scenarios in Figure 1 and represents instances of a tiered IoT architecture integrated with the cloud
presented in [8]. The architecture consists of the following three main tiers:
 Perceptual tier (sensors and actuators) represents a data source level composed of low-power
constrained devices that can sense their surroundings to generate data or execute simple tasks.
 Intermediate tier (sink nodes and rendezvous collection points) is a data forwarding level com-
posed of devices with limited processing capabilities that collect and aggregate data from the
perceptual tier, perform preprocessing tasks before forwarding the data to the cloud tier, and
remotely manage devices of the perceptual tier.
 Cloud tier (database and application servers) represents a service level which offers computing
resources as a utility to perform the processing/storage of data collected at the perceptual tier
and preprocessed at the intermediary tier. The data at the cloud tier can be classified as big
data, which is used to create information and knowledge, that can trigger further actions at both
the intermediary and perceptual tiers, for example, delivery of information to smartphones or
actuation tasks.
A wide adoption of IoT solutions and their integration with the cloud puts security issues in
the spotlight of any CoT system design. We identify key communication scenarios that affect the
security of the entire CoT ecosystem and focus on the process of establishing secure communica-
tion between devices, which 1) integrates the functionality to verify a data source and 2) enables
the exchange of data between devices while respecting the required privacy level. The identified
communication scenarios are shown in Figure 1.
Platform independent communication. Our secure communication model for CoT enables
secure message exchange between devices running on different IoT platforms. A platform indepen-
dent and adaptable agreement protocol is required to secure the communication between different
devices across platforms. Such agreement protocol should exchange cryptographic algorithms and
keys to enable ad hoc secure communication in a dynamic networked environment. In other words,
devices should support the possibility to dynamically change the length of cryptographic keys
Figure 1. Cloud of Things communication scenarios.
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(in order to achieve the required level of security) and also support the replacement of vulnera-
ble cryptographic algorithms. Additionally, each message should be stand-alone and provide all
needed information (e.g., a message that reports a single sensor reading) and protection within
itself. In our secure communication model, the messages can either be exchanged between two
parties or routed through the entire communication architecture as shown in Figure 1(a) (e.g., mes-
sages from the cloud tier can be forwarded through the intermediate tier to their destinations in the
perceptual tier).
Authenticated management of resources. All messages used for management of resources,
either at the perceptual or intermediate tier, should be authenticated in order to properly administer
a large IoT deployment. These messages are usually sent from a higher to lower tier as demon-
strated in Figure 1(b). While exchanging management messages, a producer (i.e., sender) needs
to digitally sign its messages so that a receiver can verify the origin. A digital signature gives
proof of both message integrity and origin thus enabling non-repudiation of management messages.
Because digital signatures require costly computations, they should be used only for secuting criti-
cal operations. The examples of such operations are as follows: (i) a sensor reading request which
is important for charging an IoT service; (ii) power-saving instructions that change a reading fre-
quency of a sensor node so that malicious users cannot tamper with the data acquisition process;
and (iii) support of cryptographic algorithm configuration updates that need to be received from a
verified source.
Reliable data collection. Usually, when the data flow is directed from lower tiers towards higher
tiers, it is possible for an attacker to send false or inaccurate data to higher tier devices. In our
CoT architecture, this is prevented by ensuring the integrity of sent data, using digital signatures
or HMAC [9] protection. Therefore, one of the main benefits of our CoT architecture is the data
trustworthiness, which is enabled by reliable data collection, shown in Figure 1(c). Because digital
signing is a costly operation, we recommend HMAC operation as a lightweight integrity protection
mechanism for devices from the perceptual tier, which have limited hardware capabilities and pre-
fer lightweight operations due to energy conservation. For example, HMAC operation can be used
for data collection from sensors that do not measure sensitive information (e.g., air or water quality
measurements, which are of public interest but have to be verifiable). The HMAC operation ensures
integrity of data from its source to destination but does not explicitly provide proof of origin. How-
ever, because devices from the perceptual tier are designated data sources, this operation implicitly
provides the proof of origin between different tiers of our CoT architecture.
Sensitive data protection. Sometimes the collected data can be sensitive and therefore should be
protected from information leakage as illustrated in Figure 1(d). This can happen in communication
within or between all tiers in the CoT architecture. Although sensors usually collect non-sensitive
data, certain use cases, for example, health monitoring applications, must not leak any measured
information. Moreover, certain corporate applications could also have a requirement that all data
exchanged within a CoT environment needs to be secret. Furthermore, communication between
cloud instances usually includes sensitive information about users (e.g., user preferences or rec-
ommendations). In our CoT architecture, sensitive data protection is achieved by using symmetric
encryption with a previously exchanged shared key.
3. SECURE CLOUD OF THINGS COMMUNICATION MODEL
The secure communication model for the CoT is defined as a sextuple SCoT :
SCoT D ¹D;K;L;C;A;Oº; (1)
where D is a set of all devices, K is a set of all key pairs (public and private keys) of all devices, L
is a set of all layers on which devices can communicate, C is a set of all possible device hardware
capabilities, A is a set of cryptographic algorithms, which devices can use, and O is a set of secure
communication operations between devices.
We distinguish three different types of cryptographic algorithms in the set A D ¹Ah; As; Apº:
cryptographic hash algorithms Ah, secret key algorithms As , and public/private key algorithms Ap .
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Softw. Pract. Exper. (2016)
DOI: 10.1002/spe
SECURE COT
A device Di in our model is represented with its set of supported communication layers Li , set
of its hardware capabilities Ci , set of supported cryptographic algorithms Ai , and set of public and
private key pairs Ki :
Di 2 D W ¹Di D ¹Li ; Ci ; Ai ; Kiº; Li  L;Ci  C;Ai  A;Ki  Kº; (2)
where Ai D ¹Ahi ; Asi ; Api º such that Ahi  Ah, Asi  As and Api  Ap .
Each key pair k.api / 2 Ki is generated to match the corresponding public/private key algorithm
a
p
i 2 Api . A key pair k.api / contains a private key pri.api / and corresponding public key pub.api /:
k.a
p
i / D ¹pri.api /; pub.api /º: (3)
A set of device’s public keys must be transferred to the other device when initiating secure
communication between them. The set of public keys PKi of a device Di is defined as
PKi D ¹pub.api / 2 k.api / W k.api / 2 Kiº: (4)
In our model, two devices Di and Dj can communicate only if the following holds, Li \Lj ¤ ;.
This means that devices Di and Dj share a common communication layer, which can be used for
secure communication. A communication layer defines the type of interface (wired or wireless) and
network protocols that can be used for data exchange between devices (Bluetooth, Zigbee, WLAN,
Ethernet, TCP/IP, etc.). Note that a typical device from the perceptual tier has a wireless interface
(e.g., Bluetooth or Zigbee) for interaction with an intermediate tier device, while the latter device
uses a high speed communication interface (e.g., WLAN or Ethernet) to communicate with the
cloud tier.
If two devices share a common communication layer, they can communicate independently of
the tiers they belong to. Tiers are used to classify devices based on their capabilities. They are not
meant to impose any limitations other than the shared communication layer.
To secure communication between devices in our model, we define a set of operations O , which
is composed of the six secure communication operations that are used for agreement, data integrity,
authentication, and data secrecy.
O D ¹agreement; sign; verify_signature; hmac; encrypt; decryptº (5)
The selection of a cryptographic algorithm and shared secret agreement operation (agreement )
is a prerequisite for secure communication between an initiator Di and responder Dj and needs to
be conducted before all other operations. As a result of this operation, both devices agree upon a
cryptographic algorithm triplet ( QAij ) to be used on both devices, shared secret key (Sij ) that can be
used to protect data and public key for each device:
agreement W .Di ;Dj / 7! ¹ QAij ; Sij ; pub.api /; pub.apj /º; (6)
where QAij D ¹ QAhij ; QAsij ; QApij º such that QAhij 2 Ahi \ Ahj , QAsij 2 Asi \ Asj , and QApij 2 Api \ Apj .
In other words, the agreed cryptographic hash, secret key, and public/private key algorithms must
be supported by both devices. The public keys pub.api / and pub.a
p
j / correspond to the selected
public/private key algorithm QApij so that api D apj D QApij . The shared secret key Sij is calculated by
using the Diffie–Hellman (DH) key exchange, which is described in Section 4.
Our model is flexible as it supports different procedures for selecting QAij among cryptographic
algorithms supported by both devices. The selection procedure depends on a desired criterion such
as the required level of security, as we explain in Section 4.2.
The model supports the following secure communication operations, which can be performed
only after a successful agreement operation:
 Data integrity and authentication operation (sign) is used to digitally sign data, which is
exchanged between a sender Di and receiver Dj
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sign W Œdata; QAhij ; QApij ; pri.api / 7! ¹signatureº: (7)
The signature is derived from data by calculating its hash using the selected hash algorithm QAhij
and then by signing the calculated hash using the algorithm api D QApij and its corresponding pri-
vate key pri.api /. The device Dj verifies the received signature using the verify_signature
operation:
verify_signature W Œ¹data; signatureº; QAhij ; QApij ; pub.api / 7! Œt rue; false: (8)
The receiver Dj verifies the received signature deriving the hash from signature using the
algorithm apj D QApij and corresponding public key pub.api /, and then compares it to the hash
value calculated on device Dj from received data using the algorithm QAhij . Hash-based message authentication code data authentication and integrity operation (hmac) is
based on HMAC [9] function and is used as a lightweight data protection mechanism when
exchanging data between a sender Di and receiver Dj :
hmac W .data; QAhij ; Sij / 7! ¹authentication_codeº (9)
The authentication_code is calculated using the selected hash algorithm QAhij on
data and previously agreed secret key Sij . The device Dj compares the received
authentication_code with the authentication_code calculated using the same hmac
operation (as the sender Di ). The verification is successful when the calculated and received
authentication_code match.
 Data secrecy operations encrypt and decrypt are used to ensure that the data exchanged
between a sender Di and receiver Dj is known only to them. The encrypt operation uses the
agreed secret algorithm QAsij and key Sij to encrypt data:
encrypt W .data; QAsij ; Sij / 7! secret_data: (10)
The original data can be decrypted from the received secret data using the decrypt
operation:
decrypt W .secret_data; QAsij ; Sij / 7! data: (11)
The secure CoT communication model represents a minimal set of objects and secure commu-
nication operations, which are required to secure communication between different devices and/or
tiers in the CoT environment. Even though this model does not explicitly define an end-to-end secure
communication, this is achieved by combining multiple, point-to-point, communication channels
between two devices. It requires a that a single device is the initiator in one channel and the receiver
in an other channel. In a standard setup, a sensor would be the initiator of the communication with
a responding intermediate tier device, whereas the intermediate tier device would also be the initia-
tor for transferring data to a cloud tier device. The same channels but with reversed roles would be
needed for transferring an authenticated management message from the cloud tier.
4. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
In this section, we first present a prototype implementation of the agreement operation in the
form of the ACAP [5]. Additionally, we explain the cryptographic algorithm agreement procedure
(CAAP), which is a key part of the agreement operation. This procedure extends our univer-
sal communication model SCoT with the ability to adapt to the required security level taking into
account current device capabilities. After that, we give a short security analysis of the protocol on
which the agreement is based. Finally, we experimentally evaluate the processing time of all six
proposed secure communication operations and comment the results.
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Figure 2. Agile cryptographic agreement protocol message exchange diagram.
4.1. Agreement operation implementation
As previously stated, when two devices Di and Dj want to communicate securely, they first need
to perform the agreement operation. While performing this operation, they agree upon a crypto-
graphic algorithm triplet QAij , a shared secret Sij that can be used to protect data and a public key
for each of them, as defined in relation (6).
During this operation, four messages need to be exchanged between an initiator Di and responder
Dj , as shown in Figure 2. The figure also shows the following: (i) the data flow between devices;
(ii) functions that need to be performed during the exchange (shown in rectangles); and (iii) the final
result of the agreement operation (shown in the rounded rectangle at the bottom).
Device Di initiates the agreement operation by sending an INITi message to device Dj . This
message contains a public part of DH‡ dhi and nonce§ ni . A DH public part dhi is calculated from
an appropriate random number¶ ri , which was previously generated by Di . Nonce ni is an arbitrary
number that may only be used for a single agreement operation.
Upon receipt of an INITi message, device Dj generates|| its own (appropriate) random number
rj , calculates a DH public part dhj from rj and generates a nonce nj . After that, device Dj can
‡A Diffie–Hellman key exchange is used to exchange a shared secret between devices. [10]
§Cryptographic nonce is used to differentiate between two separate agreements and must not be reused.
¶Note that different constraints on the key generation process can be enforced, based on the type of DH key exchange.
(i.e., standard discrete logarithm DH or elliptic curve DH)
||The generation can be performed periodically in the background to make the agreement faster and less vulnerable to
resource exhaustion attacks.
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perform a pseudo-random function prf ** to create a session key NSij that will be used to secure the
rest of the agreement operation:
dh_secret D dh_calc.rj ; dhi / D dh_calc.ri ; dhj /
NSij D prf .dh_secret; ni ; nj /; (12)
where dh_calc represents a Diffie-Hellman calculation function that produces a DH shared secret
dh_secret . A session key NSij is calculated with prf function on dh_secret and nonces ni , nj .
After that, device Dj sends the INITj message, which contains a DH public part dhj , nonce nj ,
list of its hardware capabilities Cj , and list of its public keys PKj .
Upon receipt of an INITj message, device Di can calculate the same shared DH secret and
agreement operation session key NSij as device Dj , as shown in Equation (12). Device Di then
sends a LISTi message that contains a list of its hardware capabilities Ci , list of its public keys
PKi , and list of supported algorithms Ai . Upon the receipt of this message, device Dj replies with
a LISTj message which contains the list of supported algorithms for device Dj .
During the message exchange, both devices obtain a list of supported cryptographic algorithms
QAij , which is a result of the algorithm_agreement function on Ai and Aj :
algorithm_agreement.Ai ; Aj / D QAij : (13)
The resulting keys pub.api / and pub.a
p
j / are selected from PKi and PKj , respectively to match
the agreed public key algorithm api D apj D QApij 2 QAij .
Furthermore, devices Di and Dj obtain a shared secret key Sij that is different (and computa-
tionally independent) from agreement session key NSij because it is calculated using some additional
agreement data (e.g., the resulting list of agreed algorithms QAij ):
Sij D prf .dh_secret; ni ; nj ; QAij /: (14)
Note that the length of secret key Sij must match the agreed secret key algorithm QAsij 2 QAij .
Agreement messages. The four messages exchanged in the agreement operation are defined as
follows:
INITi(Di ! Dj ): dhi ; ni
INITj(Dj ! Di ): dhj ; nj ; Cj ; PKj ; sign¹.dhj /; NAh; NAp; pri.apj /º,
hmac¹.Cj ; PKj ; ni ; nj /; NAh; NSij º
LISTi (Di ! Dj ): Ci ; PKi ; Ai ; sign¹.Ai ; dhi ; dhj /; NAh; NAp; pri.api /º,
hmac¹.Ci ; PKi ; nj ; ni /; NAh; NSij º,
LISTj (Dj ! Di ): Aj ; sign¹.dhi ; dhj ; ni ; nj ; Aj /; NAh; NAp; pri.apj /º.
As we can see, besides required data that is transferred to the other side, these messages also
contain results of hmac and sign operations introduced in relations (7) and (9), which are necessary
to secure the communication between devices Di and Dj .
To protect the agreement operation from network attacks, a default cryptographic hash algo-
rithm NAh and public key algorithm NAp are used in combination with the agreement session key
NSij introduced in Equation (12). Our model requires that both default algorithms, NAh and NAp , are
supported across all devices in the architecture:
8Di 2 D W . NAh 2 Ai / ^ . NAp 2 Ai /: (15)
Additionally, it requires that keys pri.api / and pri.a
p
j / used in sign operations, while creating the
messages, must match the default public key algorithm api D apj D NAp .
**A function that uses iterative hashing to produce a pseudo-random result, based on a given input (i.e., seed).
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4.2. Cryptographic algorithm agreement procedure (CAAP)
The CAAP, as a part of the agreement operation, is defined in Algorithm 1. The CAAP procedure
takes algorithm lists of both devices (line 1), that is, Ai for Di and Aj for Dj . After that, for each
algorithm type†† (lines 2–12), it selects the algorithm with the highest score (lines 3–8) given by
function score.atype; Ci ; Cj ; slev/, based on the hardware capabilities Ci for device Di , Cj for
device Dj , and the required security level slev. Finally, it returns a triplet of selected cryptographic
algorithms QAij (line 13) or an empty set otherwise (line 10).
Algorithm 1 Cryptographic algorithm agreement procedure
1: procedure CRYPTO–AGREEMENT(Ci , Cj , Ai , Aj , slev)
2: for each type 2 ¹h; s; pº do
3: for each atype 2 .Atypei \ Atypej / do
4: if . QAtypeij DD ¿) or Œscore.atype; Ci ; Cj ; slev/ > score. QAtypeij ; Ci ; Cj ; slev/
then
5: QAtypeij = atype
6: break
7: end if
8: end for
9: if QAtypeij DD ¿ then
10: return ¿ F The negotiation was unsuccessful.
11: end if
12: end for
13: return QAij D ¹ QAhij ; QAsij ; QApij º
14: end procedure
The reason for making decisions with regard to scoring of supported cryptographic algorithms is
in determining which of them are of higher value compared with others in terms of their suitability
for a secure communication task. The score of an algorithm may be directly linked to the required
level of security of a communication task and hardware capabilities of devices because of their
limited computing, bandwidth, and power resources.
Hence, the scores of different cryptographic algorithms may be calculated using the so-called
algorithm valuation functions, which are used to rank algorithms from ‘best’ to ‘worst’. More for-
mally, we consider the overall score of algorithm a to be score.a; Ci ; Cj ; slev/, expressed as a
weighted combination of multiple value dimensions, namely: level of security slev, algorithm com-
plexity ac.a/, and currently available battery power bp, bandwidth bw; and processing power pp
of both devices:
score.a;Ci ; Cj ; slev/ D
f Œw0  slev; w1  ac.a/; w2  min.bpi ; bpj /; w3  min.bwi ; bwj /; w4  min.ppi ; ppj /;
(16)
where Ci and Cj are defined as ¹bpi ; bwi ; ppiº and ¹bpj ; bwj ; ppj º, respectively. Different
weights wx indicate the relative importance of a given value dimension contributing to the overall
algorithm score and may be considered to be application specific.
The security level is determined by the current communication scenario and the environment
in which the communication is performed. Communication in the cloud tier has a greater security
level than the communication in the perceptual tier because the amount of information transferred
is much larger and because the platform permits the use of more secure cryptographic algorithms.
The security level in inter-tier communication is also decided by the communication scenario and
affected by the distance the data needs to travel, because it increases the attack possibilities.
††Where types h, s, and p indicate cryptographic hash algorithms Ah, secret key algorithms As , and public/private key
algorithms Ap , respectively.
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4.3. Agreement protocol verification
The main requirement for a secure agreement protocol is cryptographic agility. Cryptographic agility
represents the possibility to refresh the cryptographic keys and algorithms used during commu-
nication. Most modern secure communication protocols like IPsec [11], SSL [12]/TLS [13], and
SSH [14] implement cryptographic agility and provide secure communication between two parties.
However, these protocols are fairly complex and consist of a number of components that need to
interoperate in order to provide secure communication channels. Even though solutions implement-
ing these protocols exist on more capable devices, implementation and deployment of such complex
protocols cannot be performed on perceptual tier devices in an energy and resource efficient way.
Furthermore, secure channels are not a requirement in the CoT environment because all commu-
nication can be conducted by using message based communication. In order to provide a unified
solution for all tiers in the CoT architecture, we used ACAP in complement with other secure opera-
tions which are based on safe cryptographic primitives like cryptographic hashes, digital signatures,
and symmetric encryption.
Agile cryptographic agreement protocol [5] is a lightweight solution that is completely formally
verified,‡‡ easy to implement, and deployed even on hardware with limited resources. It consists
of only four messages and is based on the SIGMA (sign and mac) principle [15] for securing the
message exchange. ACAP employs various security mechanisms both from the design and imple-
mentation perspective. It has been designed to prevent the man in the middle and late replay attacks,
which is proved by the performed formal security verification. From the implementation perspec-
tive, it provides perfect forward secrecy by using computationally independent keys for negotiation
and traffic protection, and it mitigates denial of service attacks by precomputing the most compu-
tationally expensive message parts. Additionally, the trust establishment can be performed by using
the public key infrastructure or by previously distributing public keys in a controlled environment.
4.4. Experimental evaluation
We have implemented and evaluated the performance of all six secure communication operations,
which are defined in the secure CoT communication model, on devices from different tiers. For mea-
suring each operation duration, we have used 1KB (1024 bytes) of exchanged data and performed
1000 iterations of the experiment. The following devices were used in our experiments: Arduino
Yún for the perceptual tier, Raspberry Pi for the intermediate tier, and a virtual machine instance
running on a XenServer platform for the cloud tier.
The Arduino Yún tests were performed on the Linux MIPS coprocessor Atheros AR9330 @
400 Mhz, Raspberry Pi tests were run on an ARM v6 @ 700 Mhz, whereas the XenServer instance
tests were performed on an Intel Xeon E5-2680 @ 2.7 Ghz. The prototype was implemented in
Python, and the same code was used across all platforms. The average duration of the six operations
defined in Section 3 are shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3(a) shows the average duration of the agreement procedure for Arduino and Raspberry
Pi. We see that there is a significant difference in operation duration when a device is an initiator
(i.e., Di ) of communication compared with situations in which it is a responder (i.e., Dj ). This is
mainly caused by the complexity of generating a good DH value on the initiator side. Note that the
depicted time includes the time spent on processing (i.e., creating a message before sending and
parsing it upon receipt) of all defined agreement messages, but it does not include the transmission
time between devices.
As the entire agreement process on average lasts less than 3 seconds for perceptual tier devices,
which have the most constrained hardware capabilities, it does not represent a significant over-
head in typical IoT deployments and can, in general, be performed as often as required by specific
deployments.
Figure 3(b) shows the average processing time of the sign and verify_signature operations.
The processing time is considerable for lower tier devices and thus this operation should be avoided
‡‡The entire model and verification procedure are available at http://public.tel.fer.hr/acap.
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Figure 3. Average operation duration across different tiers.
in order to preserve the power on such devices. We propose the usage of the sign operation only
for important sensor management operations, such as sending device software and configuration
updates from the higher tiers (cloud or intermediate to the lower tiers (sensors and actuators). In
such cases, the lower tier devices only perform the verify_signature operation which requires
less processing time than the original sign operation. In this figure, we can also see that the increase
in key size (i.e., from 1024 bits to 1536 or 2048 bits), which offers a greater level of security, also
prolongs the average processing time of sign and verify_signature operations.
We propose the hmac operation as a replacement to the sign operation in case of lower tier
devices because it requires substantially less processing time for the same amount of exchanged
data in comparison with the sign operation, as shown in Figure 3(c). Moreover, because the hmac
operation does not reduce the level of security when compared with the sign operation, it should
be used for ensuring data integrity during the data collection process, as explained in Section 2.
The average processing times of the encrypt and decrypt operations are shown in Figure 3(d).
These times are comparable with the hmac operation time, and thus these operations can be per-
formed as often as needed in order to provide sensitive data protection throughout all tiers of our
secure CoT communication model. Note that there is only a small increase in the processing time of
these operations when using longer keys (i.e., 256 instead of 128 bits), which provide a higher level
of security.
5. RELATED WORK
Research efforts in the area of security for the CoT can be divided into two categories: (i) privacy
related and (ii) secure communication challenges. Privacy is defined as the guarantee that users
maintain control over the release of their sensitive information [16], while secure communication
is defined as the fulfillment of primary security requirements (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and
availability) in network communication [17]. The latter paper presents the Agile Cryptographic
Negotiation Protocol (ACNP), which was the first version of the our agreement protocol that was
not formally verified and did not satisfy the needed security requirements.
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An overview of privacy related issues and open challenges in participatory sensing, which is com-
monly used in the CoT environment, is presented in [18]. The paper [19] outlines several critical
security and privacy threats for the mobile crowd sensing paradigm, a novel approach to ubiqui-
tous computing especially popularized through growth of the IoT. The analysis of nine challenges
regarding privacy and security for the opportunistic sensing, an alternative to the participatory sens-
ing in the crowd sensing paradigm, is presented in [20], alongside with conceptual solution for each
challenge. In our paper, we deal with the following 2 out of 9 challenges: data authenticity and sys-
tem integrity. Our work follows the proposed conceptual solution for data authenticity because it
provides the required computational and bandwidth-efficient authentication. Additionally, we deal
with system integrity by providing data integrity from the source to destination.
A security architecture for the CoT/IoT, compatible with our security model, is presented in [21]
where the authors identify security issues at different CoT tiers. A similar approach is used in [22]
where the authors provide a review of security features, requirements, and technologies for the
IoT. The authors of the latter paper have recognized the importance of lightweight cryptographic
protocols for reducing the energy consumption of devices in the perceptual tier. To achieve energy
savings, our CAAP procedure automatically adapts to hardware capabilities (e.g., current energy
levels) of devices and uses lightweight cryptographic protocols when necessary.
An extensive analysis of security issues and possible attacks is provided in [23] in which the
authors also discuss promising approaches for specific challenges depending on deployment archi-
tecture of an IoT system. The paper [24] analyzes emerging security problems in the IoT and
discusses possible counter measures. Another work which explains an IoT architecture from the
security and privacy point of view, and also includes a brief overview of the EU legislation in the
privacy and security area, is [25]. The work presented in [26] discusses new regulatory approaches
for privacy and security requirements in the IoT. The survey paper [27] compares security issues
between the IoT and traditional networks, and also provides practical solutions for a large number
of identified security challenges in the IoT environment.
In our paper, we do not cover trust establishment and management. For details on these topics, we
refer an interested reader to a detailed survey on the trust management for the IoT, presented in [28].
6. CONCLUSION
The paper presents a novel adaptable communication model for secure communication in the CoT.
The CoT is a heterogeneous environment, which is built on the interoperability of various devices
and platforms that should support secure communication in the case of different security scenar-
ios, such as authenticated device management, reliable data delivery, and sensitive data protection.
In this paper, we propose a generic solution that provides the essential building blocks (i.e., opera-
tions) for secure communication in the CoT with a goal to offer flexible communication mechanisms
which can adapt well to the available resources and context of a CoT environment. We also present
a practical implementation of the six proposed secure communication operations (i.e., agreement,
sign, verify signature, hmac, encrypt, and decrypt) with a special emphasis on the agreement opera-
tion, which is the basis of our adaptable secure communication model. Our experimental evaluation
demonstrates promising runtime performance of the proposed solution for different security scenar-
ios and devices in the CoT, and thus represents a valuable contribution to the current state of art
particularly in terms of the practical security implementations.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work has been supported in part by the Croatian Science Foundation under the project number 8065
(Human-centric Communications in Smart Networks). This work is supported in part by the H2020 sym-
bIoTe project, which has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation
programme under grant agreement no. 688156.
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Softw. Pract. Exper. (2016)
DOI: 10.1002/spe
SECURE COT
REFERENCES
1. Sagiroglu S, Sinanc D. Big data: A review. 2013 International Conference on Collaboration Technologies and
Systems (CTS), San Diego, CA, USA, 2013; 42–47.
2. Armbrust M, Fox A, Griffith R, Joseph AD, Katz R, Konwinski A, Lee G, Patterson D, Rabkin A, Stoica I, Zaharia
M. A view of cloud computing. Communications of the ACM 2010; 53(4):50–58.
3. Soldatos J, Kefalakis N, Serrano M, Hauswirth M. Design principles for utility-driven services and cloud-based
computing modelling for the internet of things. IJWGS 2014; 10(2/3):139–167. DOI:10.1504/IJWGS.2014.060254.
4. OWASP T. 10 2014 The Ten Most Critical Internet of Things Security Risks, 2014. Available from: https://www.
owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Internet_of_Things_Project#tab=Top_10_IoT_Vulnerabilities__282014_29 [last
accessed September 12th, 2016].
5. Vasic´ V, Mikuc M, Vukovic´ M. Lightweight and adaptable solution for security agility. KSII Transactions on Internet
& Information Systems 2016; 10:1212–1228. DOI:10.3837/tiis.2016.03.015.
6. Cremers CJF. Scyther: Unbounded Verification of Security Protocols. ETH, Department of Computer Science:
Zurich, Switzerland, 2007.
7. Cremers CJF. Scyther user manual, 2014. Available from: http://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/people/cas.cremers/scyther/index.
html [last accessed September 12th, 2016].
8. Perera C, Zaslavsky A, Christen P, Georgakopoulos D. Context aware computing for the internet of things: A survey.
Communications Surveys & Tutorials, IEEE 2014; 16(1):414–454. Available from: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1305.0982.
pdf [last accessed September 12th, 2016].
9. Bellare M, Canetti R, Krawczyk H. Keying hash functions for message authentication. In Advances in Cryptology
– CRYPTO ’96, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1109, Koblitz N (ed.). Springer: Berlin Heidelberg, 1996;
1–15. DOI:10.1007/3-540-68697-5_1.
10. Diffie W, Hellman ME. New directions in cryptography. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 1976; 22(6):
644–654.
11. Frankel S, Krishnan S. IP Security (IPsec) and Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Document Roadmap. RFC 6071
(Informational), Feb 2011. Available from: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc6071.txt [last accessed September 12th, 2016].
12. Freier A, Karlton P, Kocher P. The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Protocol Version 3.0. RFC 6101 (Historic), Aug
2011. Available from: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc6101.txt [last accessed September 12th, 2016].
13. Dierks T, Rescorla E. The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2. RFC 5246 (Proposed Standard), Aug
2008. Available from: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt [last accessed September 12th, 2016], updated by RFCs
5746, 5878, 6176.
14. Ylonen T, Lonvick C. The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture. RFC 4251 (Proposed Standard), Jan 2006.
Available from: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4251.txt [last accessed September 12th, 2016].
15. Krawczyk H. Sigma: The ’sign-and-mac’approach to authenticated diffie-hellman and its use in the ike protocols.
Advances in Cryptology-Crypto 2003, Springer: Berlin, Heidelberg, 2003; 400–425.
16. Christin D, Reinhardt A, Kanhere SS, Hollick M. A survey on privacy in mobile participatory sensing applications.
Journal of Systems and Software 2011; 84(11):1928–1946.
17. Vasic V, Mikuc M. Security agility solution independent of the underlaying protocol architecture. Proceedings of the
First International Conference on Agreement Technologies, Dubrovnik, Croatia, 2012.
18. Li Q, Cao G. Privacy-preserving participatory sensing. Communications Magazine, IEEE 2015; 53(8):68–74.
19. Yang K, Zhang K, Ren J, Shen X. Security and privacy in mobile crowdsourcing networks: Challenges and
opportunities. Communications Magazine, IEEE 2015; 53(8):75–81.
20. Kapadia A, Kotz D, Triandopoulos N. Opportunistic sensing: Security challenges for the new paradigm. Communi-
cation Systems and Networks and Workshops, 2009. Comsnets 2009. First International, Piscataway, NJ, USA, 2009;
1–10.
21. Zhang B, Ma XX, Qin ZG. Security architecture on the trusting internet of things. Journal of Electronic Science and
Technology 2011; 9(4):364–367.
22. Suo H, Wan J, Zou C, Liu J. Security in the internet of things: A review. 2012 International Conference on Computer
Science and Electronics Engineering (ICCSEE), Vol. 3, 2012; 648–651.
23. Roman R, Zhou J, Lopez J. On the features and challenges of security and privacy in distributed internet of things.
Computer Networks 2013; 57(10):2266–2279. DOI: 10.1016/j.comnet.2012.12.018. Towards a Science of Cyber
SecuritySecurity and Identity Architecture for the Future Internet.
24. Zhao K, Ge L. A survey on the internet of things security. 2013 9th International Conference on Computational
Intelligence and Security (CIS), 2013; 663–667.
25. Kozlov D, Veijalainen J, Ali Y. Security and privacy threats in IoT architectures. Proceedings of the 7th International
Conference on Body Area Networks, BodyNets ’12, ICST (Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and
Telecommunications Engineering), ICST, Brussels, Belgium, Belgium, 2012; 256–262.
26. Weber RH. Internet- of things - new security and privacy challenges. Computer Law & Security Review 2010;
26(1):23–30. Available from: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0267364909001939 [last accessed
September 12th, 2016].
27. Jing Q, Vasilakos AV, Wan J, Lu J, Qiu D. Security of the internet of things: Perspectives and challenges. Wireless
Networks 2014; 20(8):2481–2501. DOI: 10.1007/s11276-014-0761-7.
28. Yan Z, Zhang P, Vasilakos AV. A survey on trust management for internet of things. Journal of Network
and Computer Applications 2014; 42:120–134. Available from: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S1084804514000575.
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Softw. Pract. Exper. (2016)
DOI: 10.1002/spe
